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COORDINATING LOCAL ADAPTIVE 
STRATEGIES THROUGH A NETWORK-BASED 
APPROACH 
XUEQING SHAN* 
As the impacts of climate change become increasingly destructive 
and pervasive, climate adaptation has received greater political and 
academic attention. The traditional top-down model for mitigating 
climate change, however, is ill-suited to implementing effective 
adaptation strategies. Yet, local communities most impacted by climate 
change seldom have the tools and resources to develop effective adaptive 
strategies on their own. This note argues that a bottom-up, network-
based approach could be a promising paradigm towards implementing 
effective adaptive strategies and empowering affected communities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Confronted with the impacts of climate change, a growing number 
of communities are pursuing adaptation and resilience strategies.1 
Bangladesh is a case in point. With a large and growing population,2 a 
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 1.  “Adaptation” is used in different contexts and can mean a wide range of strategies. See, 
e.g., Climate Change Adaptation Definitions, VICTORIAN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION RES., http://www.vcccar.org.au/climate-change-adaptation-definitions (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2018) (listing definitions provided by governments and major international bodies). See 
generally ROB SWART, ROBBERT BIESBROEK, SVEND BINNERUP, TIMOTHY R. CARTER, 
CAROLINE COWAN, THOMAS HENRICHS, SOPHIE LOQUEN, HANNA MELA, MICHAEL 
MORECROFT, MORITZ REESE & DANIELA REY, PARTNERSHIP FOR EUROPEAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH (PEER), PEER REPORT 1: EUROPE ADAPTS TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE: COMPARING NATIONAL STRATEGIES (2009) (listing a wide range of adaptation 
strategies). This paper uses the term to refer to conventional strategies that aim to modify human 
activities in response to environmental risks, and not strategies that attempt to modify the 
environment itself, such as geoengineering. 
 2.  See Saleemul Huq & James Totton, Basket Case No More? Bangladesh’s Successes 
Portend Resilience in Face of Change, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS: NEW 
SECURITY BEAT (Feb. 17, 2014), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2014/02/basket-case-more-
bangladeshs-development-successes-portend-resilience-face-change/ (noting that “[a]fter 
independence, Bangladesh’s population growth rate was one of the highest in the world”). 
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heavy dependence on agriculture,3 and a geographic location 
particularly prone to extreme weather events,4 Bangladesh is among 
the countries most vulnerable to sea level rise and other climate-
related impacts.5 At the same time, it is also one of the most informed 
countries about adapting to climate change.6 With its effective 
emergency warning system, Bangladesh has been able to drastically 
reduce casualties from natural disasters,7 and it has heavily invested in 
long-term resilience building by reducing poverty, promoting 
education for women, and ensuring food security through agricultural 
innovations.8 
National governments are not the only actors adapting to climate 
change. In recent years, subnational communities adopting adaptive 
strategies have proliferated. Cities are at the forefront of this trend. For 
example, New Orleans, in anticipation of rising sea levels and more 
intense storms due to climate change, has improved its water 
management system, updated building codes, and established a 
citywide evacuation system.9 Some neighborhoods have also begun 
implementing creative solutions specifically tailored to addressing 
local climate risks. For example, St. Kjeld, a neighborhood in 
Copenhagen recently hit by a devastating cloudburst, replaced asphalt 
 
 3.  See The World Factbook: Bangladesh, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Apr. 24, 
2018), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html (noting that 
“almost half of Bangladesh is are employed in the agriculture sector”). 
 4.  See Gardiner Harris, Borrowed Time on Disappearing Land: Facing Rising Seas, 
Bangladesh Confronts the Consequences of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/asia/facing-rising-seas-bangladesh-confronts-the-
consequences-of-climate-change.html (“Even without climate change, Bangladesh is among the 
most vulnerable places in the world to bad weather: The V-shaped Bay of Bengal funnels cyclones 
straight into the country’s fan-shaped coastline.”). 
 5.  See id.; see also Arastoo Khan, Bangladesh – The Most Climate Vulnerable Country, THE 
WORLD BANK: ENDING POVERTY IN SOUTH ASIA (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/bangladesh-most-climate-vulnerable-country 
(noting that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the World Bank, and 
Maplecroft have noticed the particular vulnerability of Bangladesh to climate change).   
 6.  See Huq & Totton, supra note 2 (“Bangladesh remains one of the most informed 
countries on how to adapt to changing environmental conditions.”). 
 7.  See id. (“Cyclone Bhola in 1970 had an official death toll between 300,000 and 
500,000; . . . Cyclone Aila in 2009, less than 200.”). 
 8.  See generally Bangladesh: Growing the Economy Through Advances in Agriculture, THE 
WORLD BANK (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2016/10/07/bangladesh-
growing-economy-through-advances-in-agriculture (“Bangladesh’s agricultural sector has 
benefited from a sound and consistent policy framework backed up by substantial public 
investments in technology, rural infrastructure and human capital.”).  
 9.  CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LA., CLIMATE ACTION FOR A RESILIENT NEW ORLEANS 14 
(July 2017), https://www.nola.gov/nola/media/Climate-Action/Climate-Action-for-a-Resilient-
New-Orleans.pdf (outlining the City of New Orleans’s adaptation initiatives).  
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with grass to collect and redirect water during floods and storms.10 
Tribes and other indigenous communities have also adopted 
community-wide adaptation plans.11 
Indeed, unlike climate change mitigation, which calls for a 
centralized coordinating regime based on a single institution applying 
the same standard to all actors, adaptation can be better addressed by 
a decentralized approach that relies on local efforts.12 Since climate 
change impacts communities differently depending on their locations 
and development statuses, adapting to climate change calls for “tailor-
made policy strategies that are fine-tuned within their context.”13 Local 
actors are better suited for implementing adaptive strategies since they 
are more attuned to the particular environmental and social conditions 
of the community than national and international actors. Local actors 
also have the greatest incentive to adapt since they benefit directly 
from adaptation. In fact, local actors have spearheaded climate change 
adaptation. The most innovative and progressive adaptation methods 
are typically found among highly granular community units.14 Given 
the momentum of local adaptation initiatives, some have touted that 
climate strategies are entering a new bottom-up paradigm with cities 
and local governments leading the way.15 
 
 10.  See Elisabeth Braw, Copenhagen Unveils First Climate-Change Adapted Neighborhood, 
AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:00AM ET), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/26/copenhagen-worlds-first-climate-adjusted-
neighborhood.html (describing St. Kjeld’s transformation).  
 11.  See generally Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Indigenous Adaptation in the Face of 
Climate Change, 21 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 129, 146–65 (2015) (describing the climate 
assessments and adaptation plans of four tribes in the U.S.). 
 12.  As used in this paper, “mitigation” refers to conventional measures to reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and does not include environmental modification methods such as 
geoengineering. “Adaptation” broadly refers to “new strategies for avoiding and recovering 
from . . . [the] harms [of climate change] and capturing and harnessing its benefits.” J.B. Ruhl, 
Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. 
L. 363, 381 (2010). The discussion set forth is limited to modifications aimed at protecting human 
activities from the impact of climate change and does not include modifications to the climate 
itself (such as geoengineering). For different definitions of adaptation, see Climate Change 
Adaptation Definitions, supra note 1, (listing definitions provided by governments and major 
international bodies). 
 13.  G. Robbert Biesbroek, Rob J. Swart & Wim G.M. van der Knaap, The Mitigation-
Adaptation Dichotomy and the Role of Spatial Planning, 33 HABITAT INT’L 230, 232 (2009). 
 14.  See generally Jerome Ross, How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate 
Policy, BREAKTHROUGH (Dec. 1, 2010) http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/ 
how_to_eat_an_elephant_a_botto_1. 
 15.  See, e.g., Steve Rayner, How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate 
Policy, 10 CLIMATE POL’Y 615, 617 (2010) (“Individual countries, and even regional and city 
administrations, have the ability to revise and implement zoning, planning and building 
regulations and invest in infrastructure in ways that drastically reduce vulnerability to climate 
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The increasing public attention on local adaptation champions, 
however, has not given much consideration to the coordination 
aspect.16 Discussions about coordinating climate action have largely 
focused on mitigation; only recently have some researchers and policy 
makers begun exploring ways to coordinate local adaptive strategies. 
Conceptually and practically, however, adaptation calls for different 
analytical and policy tools than does mitigation. An inadequate 
understanding of the need for and approaches to adaptation 
coordination can make local efforts less efficient and potentially 
undermine other environmental and policy priorities.17 
This note contributes to the emerging public and academic 
awareness of the need for adaptation coordination by providing an 
overview of the difficulty of, the need for, and the potential ways of 
coordinating localized adaptive strategies in the context of sea level 
rise. The causal relationship between climate change and sea level rise 
has been well established.18 Sea level rise affects communities at all 
different levels of economic development,19 and there are many 
examples of local adaptation.20 Part II provides an overview of the 
distinct challenges facing adaptation and the inadequacy of a 
mitigation-based framework for coordinating adaptive efforts. Part III 
argues that adaptation coordination requires a network-based 




change in the short and medium term.”); see also Ross, supra note 14 (interpreting Rayner as 
arguing that “adaptation should be tackled at its most effective level of governance”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Carley Chavara, John Furlow on Better Coordination for Better Climate 
Adaptation, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS: NEW SECURITY BEAT (Aug. 28, 
2015), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/08/john-furlow-coordination-climate-adaptation/ 
(quoting John Furlow, a climate change specialist at the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, describing the climate discourse as having been “treating ‘adaptation’ like a sector” 
and calling for more coordination with other social and environmental goals and among 
governments).  
 17.  See infra Part II.B (“The Inadequacy of a Mitigation-Based Coordination Framework”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Is Sea Level Rising?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN, 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/sealevel.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2018) (“The two major 
causes of global sea level rise are thermal expansion caused by warming of the ocean . . . and 
increased melting of land-based ice . . . .”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Sea Level Trends, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN, 
https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/sltrends/sltrends.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2018) (showing local 
sea levels rising in parts of Europe and North America that are mostly located in developed 
countries).  
 20.  See, e.g., supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO ADAPTATION 
COORDINATION 
The lack of a consistent approach to adaptation coordination is 
not surprising, since adaptation itself did not gather much serious 
attention in the climate change discourse until recently.21 Adaptation 
has been one of the most controversial topics related to climate change. 
On one hand, climate change skeptics question the gravity of the threat 
and what actions should be taken to address it.22 On the other hand, 
scientists and policymakers committed to combating climate change 
are worried that investing in adaptation may divert attention and 
resources away from mitigation.23 Only in the past few years has 
adaptation received serious political and academic attention, especially 
as headline-grabbing extreme weather events impact countries and 
communities with increasing frequency. Local adaptive strategies have 
proliferated, but coordination of these local initiatives is lacking.24 
This neglect is problematic. Adaptation has distinct scientific and 
policy challenges, and uncoordinated local efforts can have significant 
geographical, temporal, and sectoral spillovers that exacerbate existing 
inequalities among countries and communities.25 The debate over the 
merits of and the need for coordinating sub-global climate actions has 
been focused on mitigation. However, mitigation is a conceptually and 
politically different issue from adaptation, and the same analysis in the 
mitigation context is inadequate for adaptation. 
 
 21.  See Biesbroek et al., supra note 13, at 230 (discussing that adaptation approaches were 
seen as “defeatist” until recently). 
 22.  See The Pillars of Climate Change Denial, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC., 
https://ncse.com/library-resource/pillars-climate-change-denial (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) 
(noting the elements of climate change denial). 
 23.  F. DENTON, T.J. WILBANKS, A.C. ABEYSINGHE, I. BURTON, Q. GAO, M.C. LEMOS, T. 
MASUI, K.L. O’BRIEN & K. WARNER, CLIMATE-RESILIENT PATHWAYS: ADAPTATION, 
MITIGATION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS. 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1117 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT]. 
 24.  Only in the past few years did newspapers, international organizations, and climate 
scientists and policymakers begin considering the coordination problem. See generally supra note 
23; Biesbroek et al., supra note 13; Julia Laukkonen, Paola Kim Blanco, Jennifer Lenhart, Marco 
Keiner, Branko Cavric, & Cecilia Kinuthia-Njenga, Combining Climate Change Adaptation and 
Mitigation Measures at the Local Level, 33 HABITAT INT’L 287 (2009). 
 25.  See IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 23, at 1104 (“Added to other stresses 
such as poverty, inequality, or diseases, the effects of climate change will make sustainable 
development objectives such as food and livelihood security, poverty reduction, health, and access 
to clean water more difficult to achieve for many locations, systems, and affected populations.”). 
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A. Distinct Challenges to Adaptation 
A major challenge to combatting climate change is scientific 
uncertainty. Predictions of global temperature change are only 
meaningfully accurate for a couple of decades,26 and they cannot fully 
comprehend all possible secondary effects that a rising temperature has 
on the environment and human society. However, mitigation strategies 
are better able to accommodate uncertainty than adaptive strategies. 
Mitigation goals are typically benchmarked by numerical values (e.g., 
the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting temperature increase to “well 
below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels,”27 G8’s goal of 
“cut[ting] emissions by 80 percent by 2050,”28 and concerns over 
atmospheric carbon dioxide exceeding 400 parts per million).29 
Accordingly, these numerical benchmarks are established through a 
“positivistic research strategy,” which “[uses] information from a 
limited number of scientific disciplines (mainly technology and 
economics) and are embedded in sectoral policy domains.”30 
Uncertainty can thus be quantified in climate models to better project 
variables such as global temperature and carbon dioxide 
concentration.31 Thus, despite uncertainty, researchers and 
policymakers can still establish clear, meaningful, and generally 
applicable greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals. 
 
 
 26.  Zeke Hausfather, Analysis: How Well Have Climate Models Projected Global 
Warming?, CARBON BRIEF (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-how-well-have-
climate-models-projected-global-warming.  
 27.  The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2018). 
 28.  G8 Agrees to Climate Targets Despite Differences with Developing Nations, GUARDIAN 
(July 8, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/08/g8-climate-carbon-emission-
targets. 
 29.  See Nicola Jones, How the World Passed a Carbon Threshold and Why It Matters, YALE 
SCH. OF FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUD.: YALE E360 (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-the-world-passed-a-carbon-threshold-400ppm-and-why-it-
matters (quoting Ralph Keeling saying that exceeding the 400 ppm threshold put humanity “in a 
new era”). 
 30.  Biesbroek et al., supra note 13, at 231.  
 31.  See generally Andrew J. Majda & Boris Gershgorin, Quantifying Uncertainty in Climate 
Change Science Through Empirical Information Theory, 107 APPLIED MATHEMATICS 14958 
(2010) (using empirical information theory to quantify uncertainty in projecting coarse-grained 
large scale climate indicators such as CO2 concentration and temperature); Jussi S. Ylhäisi, 
Quantifying Sources of Climate Uncertainty to Inform Risk Analysis for Climate Change Decision-
Making, 20 INT’L J. JUST. & SUSTAINABILITY 811 (2015) (quantifying uncertainty in existing 
climate models). 
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By contrast, scientific uncertainty poses a greater challenge to 
adaptation because adaptation is highly context-specific and 
interdisciplinary. Adaptation involves a wide range of actors, sectors, 
and jurisdictions, and it needs to balance different policy priorities. A 
successful adaptive strategy—one that not only effectively protects the 
community from climate risks but also receives sufficient popular, 
political, and financial support—needs to measure the impact of both 
climate change itself and the proposed strategy’s impact on other 
policy goals. Compared to mitigation, adaptation depends on a more 
robust scientific foundation and requires a higher degree of accuracy. 
Since climate change involves “dynamic, feedback-plagued, nonlinear 
physical and biological trends,”32 predicting long-term climate patterns 
and projecting the effects of adaptation efforts are extremely difficult. 
Unfortunately, adaptive strategies have not received the level of 
support they deserve. Adaptation requires committing resources and 
capital towards projects that must be periodically revisited in light of 
scientific and technological advances, which is politically unpopular. A 
comprehensive study conducted in Australia shows that scientific 
uncertainty is a major barrier to implementing adaptive strategies to 
mitigate the risk of sea level rise for public and private actors across all 
sectors and decision-making levels.33 Uncertainty jeopardizes the 
return on commitments to addressing sea level change and makes it 
more difficult for decision makers to justify these commitments to 
constituents and stakeholders. 
Furthermore, no adaptive strategy can escape the possibility of 
systemic risk, which can lead to cascading damages to other locations 
and sectors. For example, as the earth’s permafrost thaws due to rising 
temperature, bacteria and viruses buried underneath could release and 
re-infect humans.34 No amount of existing information allows us to 
predict the kind of pathogens that could be released. Since we simply 
 
 32.  Ruhl, supra note 12, at 378. 
 33.  See JON BARNETT, ELISSA WATERS, SAM PENDERGAST & AEDAN PULESTON, UNIV. 
OF MELBOURNE & AUSTRALIA NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION RES. FACILITY, THE 
LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION TO SEA-LEVEL RISE IN 
AUSTRALIA 30 (2013), https://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/attached_files_publications/ 
Barnett_2013_Barriers_to_adaptation_to_sea_level_rise.pdf (noting that “[a] lack of relevant, 
reliable, consistent and comprehensible climate projections is a key barrier [to implementing 
adaptive strategies] for all respondent groups”). Respondents of the study come from private 
individuals, industry and professional associations, community organizations, local governments, 
the federal government, and academia. See id. at 7 fig.2 (identifying respondent affiliations). 
 34.  Robinson Meyer, The Zombie Diseases of Climate Change: What Lurks in the Arctic’s 
Thawing Permafrost?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/ 
archive/2017/11/the-zombie-diseases-of-climate-change/ 544274/. 
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do not know what is out there, there is little we can do to address that 
risk (except for mitigating climate change). The systemic risk in the 
context of sea level change is not as insurmountable but is just as 
difficult to assess. Glaciers are melting at a faster rate than expected, 
and recent studies have found feedback loops that accelerate ice sheet 
melting and destabilization.35 Scientists do not know enough about the 
melting glaciers near the Antarctic because it is “too remote, too cold, 
too expensive, and too complicated to have the kind of detailed 
observing program that [scientists] really need.”36 Projecting sea level 
rise is thus notoriously difficult; a recent projection “nearly doubles” 
prior ones and cautions against the possibility of a catastrophic 
scenario in the latter half of the century.37 This projection would dwarf 
all existing expectations of sea level rise and would require 
transformative strategies to protect communities.38 
These features of adaptation lead to the distinct institutional 
structure of adaptive programs. While the impact of global climate 
change might be hard to assess due to the complexity of the climate 
system, the particular risks facing each community are easier to 
identify. The geographic and historical trends of a locale can assist local 
actors to predict short-term trends. Local actors are also better 
positioned to navigate the interconnected political, economic, and 
cultural dynamics in the area to integrate adaptive strategies into the 
existing social fabric in a cost-effective manner.39 Furthermore, since 
the benefits of adaptation are reaped immediately and locally, there is 
a stronger incentive for individual adaptive effort. Stakeholders with 
 
 35.  See Brad Plumer, The Hardest Part of Dealing with Sea-Level Rise Will Be the 
Uncertainty, VOX (updated Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/ 
2016/12/16/13971720/sea-level-rise-uncertainty-climate (noting that ice shelfs crumble in 
Antarctica and Greenland and that “meltwater on the surface of ice sheets can open up crevasses 
that break apart ice shelves entirely, causing further destabilization and faster ice flow into the 
ocean”). 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  See Robert M. DeConto, Contribution of Antarctica to Past and Future Sea-Level Rise, 
531 NATURE 591 (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature17145 (projecting that 
“Antarctica has the potential to contribute more than a metre of sea-level rise by 2100 and more 
than 15 metres by 2500 if emissions continue unabated”). 
 38.  See Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Scientists Nearly Double Sea Level Rise Projections 
for 2100, Because of Antarctica, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/30/antarctic-loss-could-double-expected-sea-level-rise-by-
2100-scientists-say (noting that Ben Strauss from Climate Central commented that “[s]hould the 
new research prove correct, it could trigger a ‘tectonic shift’ in expectations for the speed and 
severity of the sea level problem”). 
 39.  See IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 23, at 1120 (noting that local 
institutions are crucial to ensure policy effectiveness). 
19.Final_ME_review (Do Not Delete) 1/1/2019  2:29 PM 
Fall 2018] COORDINATING LOCAL ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES 191 
different levels of capital, expertise, and objectives can be involved in 
adaptation.40 Thus, while mitigation coordination has largely taken the 
form of a top-down, centralized paradigm through instruments such as 
international treaties that set a consistent set of goals and standards, 
adaptation has largely taken the form of a bottom-up approach that 
involves “tailor-made policy strategies that are fine-tuned within their 
context of application in order to effectively reduce the impact of 
climate change.”41 
As local adaptation programs proliferate, however, there are 
multiple dimensions of spillover risks due to the interdependence of 
the various actors, sectors, and locales involved. One locale’s adaptive 
strategy may increase nearby locales’ vulnerability to climate-related 
risks (geographical spillover); adaptive projects built based on short-
term climate projections may make future adaptation difficult or more 
costly (temporal spillover); and certain adaptive strategies might 
undermine other policy priorities (policy spillover).42 
Responses to sea level rise illustrate these risks. The two main 
responses are building barriers and relocating to areas with better 
adaptive capacity.43 Building barriers can entail all three kinds of 
spillovers. Physical barriers can have geographical spillovers when they 
result in unexpected secondary effects on nearby locales. For example, 
upstream flood-control dikes can make downstream areas more 
vulnerable to floods. Specifically, studies have shown that dike 
construction in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta has increased 
downstream flood risk.44 It may undermine other environmental policy 
priorities when the barriers adversely impact the local ecosystem’s own 
 
 40.  Professor Ruhl identified seven adaptation design parameters: actor (public-planned vs. 
private-autonomous), orientation (proactive vs. reactive), goals (avoiding/repairing harm vs. 
capturing benefits), management target (responding to changed variability of environmental 
events vs. responding to absolute changes in environmental conditions), policy foundation 
(substantive vs. procedural), capital employed (technological, financial, human, social, & natural), 
and strategy (reduce vulnerability vs. enhance resilience). See Ruhl, supra note 12, at 381–85 
(discussing the seven parameters in adaptation design). 
 41.  Biesbroek et al., supra note 13, at 232. 
 42.  See, e.g., Nguyen Van Khanh Triet, Nguyen Viet Dung, Hideto Fujii, Matti Kummu, 
Bruno Merz & Heiko Apel, Has Dyke Development in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta Shifted 
Flood Hazard Downstream?, 21 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. 3991, 3991 (2017) (concluding 
that “high-dyke development has raised the flood hazard downstream”). 
 43.  See, e.g., Climate Change Adaptation Resource Center, Sea Level Rise, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/arc-x/climate-impacts-water-utilities#tab-4 (describing “build[ing] flood 
barriers to protect infrastructure” and “relocate[ing] facilities to higher elevations” as two 
strategies to adapt to sea level change). 
 44.  See Nguyen Van Khanh Triet et al., supra note 42. 
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internal response to sea level rise.45 Physical barriers can also have 
temporal spillovers; for example, if they have to be reassessed or 
rebuilt in the future to reflect newer projections of sea level rise, future 
adaptive costs will be higher. 
Relocation entails a greater range of environmental, social, and 
cultural values that might be compromised. Relocating entire 
communities—for climate or other reasons—creates additional burden 
for the hosting locale. A hosting locale may face the environmental and 
socioeconomic burdens of an increasing population in the event that it 
takes in residents from areas affected by rising sea levels. The 
additional environmental stress may be manifested in water and food 
shortage, loss of forestry and biodiversity, and pollution.46 Depending 
on the social and cultural proximity of the relocated and hosting 
locales, there may also be additional conflicts between the two 
communities. 
Furthermore, in many cases, the full range of spillovers and their 
impact caused by an adaptive strategy cannot be fully assessed. Some 
strategies bring co-benefits not explicitly comprehended at the 
planning and implementation stage. In the case of the Vietnamese 
Mekong Delta dikes, researchers found that although peak flood level 
may have deepened due to the construction of dikes, high dikes have 
helped redistribute floodwater and reduce the volume of water.47 
Similarly, relocation has positive policy spillovers when it facilitates 
knowledge and technology transfer between the hosting and relocated 
communities.48 By contrast, even flow-through dams designed for flood 
control (which are built to allow natural flow and to control floods 
 
 45.  See Pam M. Berry, Sally Brown, Minpeng Chen, Areti Kontogianni, Olwen Rowlands, 
Gillian Simpson & Michalis Skourtos, Cross-Sectorial Interactions of Adaptation and Mitigation 
Measures, 128 CLIMATE CHANGE 381, 386 (2015) (“[C]oastal hard-engineering could prevent 
coastal ecosystems migrating inland in response to sea-level rise.”). 
 46.  See, e.g., John O. Oucho, Environmental Impact of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons in Sub-Saharan Africa 11 (African Migration Alliance Biennial Workshop on Climate 
Change Environment and Migration, East London, South Africa, Nov. 15–16, 2007), 
https://goo.gl/3hNG2E (listing negative and positive environmental impacts of refugees and 
internally displaced persons). 
 47.  See Dung Duc Tran, Gerardo van Halsema, Petra J.G.J. Hellegers, Long Phi Hoang, 
Tho Quang Tran, Matti Kummu & Fulco Ludwig, Assessing Impacts of Dike Construction on the 
Flood Dynamics of the Mekong Delta, 22 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. 1875, 1890 (2018) 
(noting that “continued high dike construction over the period from 2000 is likely to increase the 
flood risk across the entire LXQ,” but “dike construction has produced radical changes in the 
floodwater balance and distributions . . . [by] reduc[ing] the volumes of floodwater reaching the 
LXQ”). 
 48.  See, e.g., Oucho, supra note 46 (listing negative and positive environmental impacts of 
refugees and internally displaced persons). 
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when the water level rises)49 are touted for their downstream-locale-
friendliness but can have negative geographical spillovers, since they 
may increase sedimentation in downstream water channels.50 In most 
cases, the initial environmental impact assessment of an adaptive 
project does not fully anticipate the multidimensional spillover effects 
it may have, and follow-up assessments tend to be sporadic and 
inconclusive.51 
The scientific uncertainty of adaptive strategies complicates 
policymaking. First, uncertainty jeopardizes a project’s environmental 
effectiveness. An adaptive strategy that benefits one locale for 20 years 
at the expense of other locales’ wellbeing or biodiversity is not 
sustainable. Furthermore, the multiple dimensions of possible 
spillovers often require local policymakers to balance different policy 
priorities. Policymakers acting individually cannot be trusted to strike 
the right balance, given the objective difficulty of balancing incentives, 
the natural tendency for individual actors to seek personal gain at the 
sacrifice of the collective good, and their susceptibility to giving in to 
their constituents’ particular political ideologies.52 Lastly, the 
uncertainty of adaptive projects may also make them less popular, 
since the projects might require periodical reassessment in light of new 
evidence and provide uncertain returns. 
Worse yet, absent coordination, the multidimensional and 
interconnected spillover effects can exacerbate the existing inequality 
among communities. Developing countries tend to be hit the hardest 
by climate change due to lack of financial resources, infrastructure, and 
expertise in responding to those impacts.53 Compared to developed 
 
 49.  See Flow-Through Dam for Flood Control, CLIMATE TECH. CTR. & NETWORK, 
https://www.ctc-n.org/technologies/flow-through-dam-flood-control (last visited Apr. 29, 2018) 
(explaining flow-through dams).  
 50.  See TETSUMI SUMI, DESIGNING AND OPERATING FLOOD RETENTION DRY ‘DAMS’ IN 
JAPAN AND USA 7,  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266293841 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2018) (“Generally, dry dams have also advantage on environmental impacts to downstream river 
since there may be almost no change in water quality and sediment transport in river with and 
without dams, . . . [but] relatively coarse sediments such as sand and gravel may be discharged in 
a low concentration a little delaying from the inflow one. This delay may cause sedimentation in 
reservoir and sediment deposition in the downstream river channel.”). 
 51.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION ASSESSMENT 6 (Dec. 2009) (observing that ongoing monitoring and 
follow-up reassessment are absent from many adaption projects).  
 52.  Studies have found that customers’ political ideologies even affect their purchase 
behavior, see generally Dena M. Gromet, Howard Kunreuther & Richard P. Larrick, Political 
Ideology Affects Energy-Efficiency Attitudes and Choices, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9314 
(2013), which suggests that political ideology can also be a powerful factor for policymakers.  
 53.  See, e.g., Laukkonen et al., supra note 24, at 288–89 (discussing that poor countries are 
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countries, developing countries are already much less equipped to 
implement local measures to adapt to climate change. The 
multidimensional spillovers from uncoordinated adaptive efforts 
exacerbate this existing inequality. Poorer countries may not be able to 
defend themselves against the spillovers from upstream rich countries’ 
adaptive strategies, and they may not have the scientific and legal 
capacity to prove the negative effects of upstream adaptive measures.54 
Lacking access to financing and technology to respond to the now 
compound climate impact—the impact of climate change itself and the 
spillovers from upstream countries—developing countries would bear 
the brunt of the consequences of uncoordinated adaptive actions. 
B. The Inadequacy of a Mitigation-Based Coordination Framework 
To address the distinct challenges of adaptation, local efforts 
should be coordinated. Coordinating adaptive strategies can produce 
myriad benefits across sectors. Coordination can promote climate 
research by bringing scientists together and reducing unnecessary 
duplication of research efforts. Knowledge sharing and information 
transfer can help locales learn from each other and better adapt to 
similar impacts from climate change. Inter-jurisdictional dialogues can 
help policymakers better understand the impact of their actions and 
align different locales’ incentives. Existing proposals for coordinating 
climate actions are largely developed for the mitigation problem. But 
a mitigation-based coordination analysis is inadequate for designing 
adaptation coordination because mitigation is conceptually and 
practically different from adaptation. 
Mitigation is a collective action problem.55 Since the effects of 
GHGs are evenly distributed in the atmosphere, individuals only bear 
a small fraction of the climate impact of their activities. Thus, each 
locale has every incentive to emit as much as necessary to achieve 
development goals and no incentive to reduce emissions in a way that 
sacrifices their other economic priorities. The history of GHG 
emissions has been a classic case of the “tragedy of the commons.” 
Since no single jurisdiction’s emission reduction effort can make a 
meaningful difference in reducing the aggregate carbon dioxide in the 
 
hit hardest by climate change due to their lack of resources). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, What is the Economics of Climate Change?, 7 WORLD ECON. 1, 
4 (2006) (noting that climate change is “a problem of intertemporal international collective action 
with major uncertainty and linked market failures”). 
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atmosphere,56 regional efforts at mitigation will not work unless the 
actors that do mitigate constitute a critical mass that meaningfully 
reduces the global level of GHGs. Global coordination is thus 
essential. Uncoordinated local efforts may even incentivize other 
actors to emit more: knowing that others are cutting emissions, some 
actors may feel less urgency about cutting their own emissions and 
pursue short-term, more carbon-intensive projects instead—a 2.0 
version of the tragedy of the commons scenario. The main policy 
challenge in the mitigation context is therefore incentivizing 
participation and addressing the free-rider problem.57 
But adaptation faces the opposite incentive problem: each 
jurisdiction has every incentive to adapt, since each individual locale 
reaps all of the benefit of their own adaptation. Each locale has no 
reason to care about the spillover effect of its actions on nearby locales. 
Additionally, the locale cares about environmental priorities and 
adopts a long-term perspective only insofar as its constituents do. In 
the case of a subnational jurisdiction, spillovers to nearby locales, to 
other policy priorities, and to future generations may be curbed by 
domestic law.  
Still, the spillover will not be easily remedied—or even 
recognized—if it happens between countries. A burdened jurisdiction 
may not be able to seek recourse due to, say, the difficulty of proving 
causation or the lack of developed international rules and procedures 
governing such disputes. 
Mitigation and adaptation call for different kinds of coordination 
due to their conceptual differences. The main concern over 
uncoordinated mitigation is the leakage problem. Leakage refers to the 
phenomenon that emission reductions in one locale lead to increased 
emissions in other locales.58 Scholars and researchers have pointed to 
two economic reasons why regional mitigation policies lead to carbon 
leakage. First, one jurisdiction’s emission reduction policy may lead 
carbon-intensive firms to relocate to jurisdictions with more lax 
 
 56.  Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 
155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1961, 1966 (2007) (“[N]o state could effectively control its own ambient 
level of carbon dioxide or other GHGs, because that ambient level is determined by the 
worldwide concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.”). 
 57.  See id. at 1965 (discussing how “[e]ach state (or country) has an incentive to free ride on 
other states’ (or countries’) actions, enjoying the global benefits without bearing the local costs,” 
resulting in underinvestment in abatement).  
 58.  See id. at 1967 (stating that subglobal action “suffers from cross-border ‘leakage’ of 
emissions: subglobal regulatory coverage encourages source activities to shift or ‘leak’ to 
unregulated areas over time”). 
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emission regulations, thus leaving the total global carbon emissions 
unaffected.59 Secondly, reduction of demand for fossil fuels in one 
jurisdiction may lead to a global decline of the price of fossil fuels, 
thereby increasing the demand from other jurisdictions.60 In addition, 
leakage can result from moral hazard: knowing that other locales are 
adopting stringent mitigation policies, non-mitigating locales may feel 
less urgency to mitigate.61 
The leakage problem and the arguments against sub-global 
mitigation efforts developed around it, however, do not apply in the 
adaptation context. Adaptation is not a collective action problem. 
Unlike mitigation, which conceptually lends itself to a global, 
centralized coordination framework, localization is inherent to the 
concept of adaptation. The assessment of and strategies to cope with 
climate risks are context specific, as each locale’s climate vulnerability 
is intimately related to its “geophysical, biological, and socio-economic 
systems”62 or “the totality of relationships in a given social situation . . 
. in combination with environmental forces.”63 
Effective adaptation depends to a much lesser extent—if at all, 
without financing—on the adaptation efforts of other locales. The 
benefits of each locale’s adaptation effort are reaped entirely by that 
locale; one locale would not “slack off” or delay adaptation efforts just 
because others are adapting.  
Furthermore, instead of driving capital away to non-adapting 
jurisdictions, adaptation may instead attract capital by reducing the 
physical and regulatory risks of the investing environment. In sum, 
relatively independent from each other, regional actors have more 
incentive to adopt progressive adaptation strategies that benefit 
 
 59.  See, e.g., Brad Plumer, A Closer Look at How Rich Countries “Outsource” Their CO2 
Emissions to Poorer Ones, VOX (Apr 18, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2017/4/18/15331040/emissions-outsourcing-carbon-leakage (“If the US ever got 
serious about adopting strict limits on CO2 emissions, one thing policymakers might worry about 
is that many of America’s factories and plants would simply move overseas, blunting the plan’s 
effectiveness.”).  
 60.  See Joshua Elliott, Ian Foster, Sam Kortum, Gita Khun Jush, Todd Munson & David 
Weisbach, Unilateral Carbon Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments, and Carbon Leakage 1 (Univ. of 
Chicago Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 600, 2012) (“[I]f nations with carbon controls 
use fewer fossil fuels, the price of fossil fuels may go down, resulting in more use in other 
regions.”); see also Wiener, supra note 56, at 1967–68 (describing these two phenomena as 
“carbon relocation” and “price effect”). 
 61.  See Wiener, supra note 56, at 1967–68 (referring to the moral hazard problem as the 
“slack off effect”).  
 62.  Laukkonen et al., supra note 24, at 288 (citation omitted). 
 63.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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themselves. Thus, instead of leakage, the concern for adaptation is 
spillover, as detailed in Section A. 
Thus, the kind of coordination that adaptation calls for is very 
different from the kinds of coordination that mitigation requires. 
Adaptation involves a wider range of actors, multiple areas of policy, 
and much greater scientific and political uncertainty, thus calling for a 
different coordination tailored to these distinct challenges. While 
mitigation demands inclusion and centralization, adaptation 
coordination fares better under an integrated, network-based model. 
The following section describes this model. 
III. A NETWORK-BASED APPROACH TO COORDINATION 
Compared to a centralized governance framework, which 
concentrates decision-making authority in one institution, a network-
based framework distributes authority to various participants in the 
network and focuses instead on promoting collaboration and 
exchange.64 A positive side effect of this organizational flexibility is 
temporal flexibility—by dispersing decision-making authority, a 
network-based approach also allows various actors to respond to new 
problems as they arise. Thus, while a centralized framework 
“frontloads” decision making both institutionally, by delegating 
authority to high-level actors, and temporally, by focusing on the initial 
planning and assessment stage, a network-based approach distributes 
decision making by empowering all actors and allowing for later-stage, 
ad hoc responses.65 
A network-based framework is thus better suited to solve complex 
problems such as coordinating climate change adaptation,66 which 
needs to respond both to intra-system connectivity (e.g., feedback 
loops within the global climate system and their localized effects) and 
to inter-system spillovers,67 often with inadequate information. Its 
organizational and temporal flexibility can better integrate new 
 
 64.  See, e.g., GABRIEL A. HUPPÉ & HEATHER CREECH , INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., DORIS KNOBLAUCH, THE FRONTIERS OF NETWORKED GOVERNANCE 1 (2012) (“By 
making use of governance networks that may self-organize within bounds to help support certain 
policy-making functions, networked governance integrates distributed capacities for problem 
solving and policy-making.”). 
 65.  Cf. id. at 7 (comparing “self-organized” governance networks with “acting steering” 
governance networks).  
 66.  See id. at 4 (“Problems of higher complexity require governance networks that are more 
heterogeneous.”). 
 67.  See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing multidimensional spillover 
effects). 
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scientific evidence, multiple dimensions of policy priorities, and 
different kinds of actors. Better still, the existing bottom-up model of 
climate adaptation already provides the institutional foundation 
needed for a network-based coordination framework. 
The remainder of Part III discusses the existing structure of global 
coordination of adaptive strategies and highlights some features and 
institutions that might develop to facilitate a network-based 
framework. 
A. Current State of Adaptation Coordination 
Currently, regional adaptive strategies lack a coherent organizing 
policy. The fragmented landscape of adaptation makes adaptation 
much less efficient than it would be with coordination. Jurisdictions 
facing similar problems could have learned from each other and 
avoided starting from scratch. For example, a major barrier to local 
adaptation planning is access to scientific information. In many 
instances, scientific data do exist, but the public and policymakers are 
not equipped to interpret the information and translate it into 
actionable strategies.68 Absent coordination, each community has to 
reinvent the wheel and invests in technical consultancy to translate raw 
scientific data to comprehensible policy recommendations, even 
though the same challenge might have been addressed by other 
similarly situated communities. 
Furthermore, uncoordinated adaptive strategies undermine other 
policy priorities, especially mitigation. Adaptation competes directly 
with mitigation for limited levels of extant climate finance. In 2016, 
over $112 billion was dedicated to mitigation financing and $23 billion 
to adaptation financing,69 although adaptation is estimated to require 
at least $70 billion every year.70 Certain adaptive strategies can 
undermine mitigation goals. For example, adapting to sea level rise by 
 
 68.  See Linda Shi, Eric Chu & Jessica Debats, Explaining Progress in Climate Adaptation 
Planning Across 156 U.S. Municipalities, 81 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 191, 194 (2015) (noting that cities 
in the U.S. rely on technical consultants to interpret climate data and have difficulty 
communicating them to the public); BARNETT ET AL., supra note 33, at 30 (noting that many 
respondents lacked “tools and techniques to translate information into informed decisions at the 
local level”).  
 69.  See The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2017, CLIMATE POLICY INITIATIVE 12 
fig.9 (2017) (reporting “[p]ublic climate finance by use”). 
 70.  See UNEP Report: Cost of Adapting to Climate Change Couse Hit $500B Per Year by 
2050, U.N. SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS (May 10, 2016), https://www.un.org/ 
sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/05/unep-report-cost-of-adapting-to-climate-change-could-
hit-500b-per-year-by-2050 (“Previous estimates place the cost of adapting to climate change at 
between $70 to $100 billion annually for the period 2010-2050.”). 
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building dikes can disrupt the coastal ecosystem by eliminating 
wetlands,71 which are excellent sources of carbon sequestration,72 and 
vice versa: high-density urban planning can “provide . . . common 
energy schemes that . . . reduce emissions,” but it also makes the area 
more vulnerable to climate-related impact by increasing the risk of 
urban flooding.73 
A further consequence of the lack of coordination is the political 
abuse of the adaptation label. Given the complexity and 
interconnectivity of the global environmental, social, and political 
ecosystem, the term “adaptation” can refer to anything conceivably 
related to climate change. For example, a 2016 article argues that many 
of Singapore’s climate adaptation policies were in fact little more than 
conventional vital systems security policies such as food and water 
security.74 Instead of recognizing the complex, interconnected, or 
“pluripotent” nature of climate change, the island nation has largely 
viewed the environment as just one variable in its engineering toolkit 
to stage artificial, anthropogenic transformations to achieve other 
policy goals.75 Its “climate initiative” was just a plan to achieve policy 
 
 71.  See Up to Four-Fifths of Wetlands Worldwide Could Be at Risk for Sea Level Rise, UNIV. 
OF CAMBRIDGE (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/up-to-four-fifths-of-
wetlands-worldwide-could-be-at-risk-from-sea-level-rise (reporting on research showing the 
impact of sea level rise on wetlands and pointing out that “[a] main reason for the high 
vulnerability of coastal wetlands to sea level rise is coastal ‘squeeze,’ a consequence of long-term 
coastal protection strategies, such as dikes”); see also Louise W. Bedsworth & Ellen Hanak, 
Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of Challenges and Tradeoffs in Six Areas, 76 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 477, 479 (2010) (“Sea-level rise will . . . accentuate the existing tradeoffs between 
coastal development and coastal ecosystem conservation.”). 
 72.  See generally, e.g., A. M. Nahlik & M. S. Fennessy, Carbon Storage in US Wetlands, 7 
NATURE COMM. 13835: 1 (2016) (highlighting the role of wetlands in storing carbon). 
 73.  Laukkonen et al., supra note 24, at 289. 
 74.  See Jerome Whitington, Modernist Infrastructure and the Vital Systems Security of Water: 
Singapore’s Pluripotent Climate Futures, 28 PUB. CULTURE 415, 417, 420 (2016) (noting that 
Singapore’s adaptation policy is grounded in its vital systems security policies and pointing out 
that Singapore’s adaptation focuses more on environmental engineering and planning rather than 
assessing uncertainty and allowing flexibility); see also Eric Klinenberg, Climate Change: 
Adaptation, Mitigation, and Critical Infrastructures, 28 PUB. CULTURE 187, 191 (2016) 
(summarizing Whitington’s argument that “government officials [in Singapore] have framed 
conventional population security policies as climate change adaptation strategies”). Vital systems 
are interlinked systems that a society depends on to function property. See generally Stephen J. 
Collier & Andrew Lakoff, Vital Systems Security: Reflexive Biopolitics and the Government of 
Emergency, 32 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 19 (2015) (describing “the historical emergence of 
vital systems security”). 
 75.  See Whitington, supra note 74, at 420 (“[Singapore] is far too confident that it knows 
what climate change holds in store, with the result of limiting its apprehension of the future to a 
small number of constrained variables.”).  
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goals under a linear projection of global warming76 and would in fact 
increase its carbon emissions by as much as 60 percent.77 Absent a 
consistent understanding of what adaptation entails, multiple actors 
would be operating under different climate paradigms using the same 
“adaptation” label, which can exacerbate the existing fragmentation of 
the climate landscape. 
B. Features of a Network-Based Approach 
A network-based approach has multiple advantages and can 
effectively mitigate these existing and potential consequences of the 
fragmented adaptation landscape. In recent years, subnational 
initiatives in the U.S. have become more connected with each other, 
and their success illustrates some of these advantages. 
One of the major advantages of a network-based approach is 
knowledge sharing. Communities facing similar climate challenges can 
share knowledge and experience, thus reducing the cost of adaptation 
design and promoting the development of better adaptive strategies. 
Furthermore, communities can better identify synergies and tradeoffs 
through collaboration, thus better integrating adaptation and 
mitigation.78 Knowledge sharing can also reduce the inequality in 
adaptive capacities by enabling vulnerable communities to strategically 
allocate limited resources. 
In the United States, for example, a major platform for adaptation 
knowledge sharing is the Adaptation Clearinghouse operated by 
Georgetown University.79 Launched in 2011, the Clearinghouse 
contains over 2,000 adaptation resources80 to assist state and local 
policymakers and academics to share information and build 
 
 76.  See id. at 417 (citations omitted) (“Singapore’s planners assume that forecasted climate 
changes will be limited to small, quantitative increases in set variables . . . [and] fail to consider 
the likelihood of potentially nonlinear or chaotic impacts on vital systems security.”). 
 77.  Id. at 431 (“The national policy advertises an 11–16 percent decrease in carbon intensity 
by 2020, while real greenhouse gas emissions will increase by at least 60 percent, to sixty-five 
metric tons, by 2020.”). 
 78.  See IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 23, at 1117 (noting that “combined 
adaptation and mitigation policy designs” should “avoid[] trade-offs, . . . identify[] synergies, . . . 
enhanc[e] responsible capacity, . . . [and] develop[] institutional links between adaptation and 
mitigation”). 
 79.  ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2018). 
 80.  Adaptation Clearinghouse 2.0 Launches with Powerful New Tools for Adaptation 
Professionals, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR. (July 14, 2016), https://www.georgetownclimate.org 
/articles/adaptation-clearinghouse-2-0-launches-with-powerful-new-tools-for-adaptation-
professionals.html. 
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partnerships.81 Resources include legal and policy developments in 
different jurisdictions, updates of scientific development, and spatial 
planning strategies. The resources can be sorted by state or by sector, 
and the Clearinghouse tracks each states’ adaptation progress. Visitors 
can also register and manage their adaptation networks through the 
platform, an especially useful feature for adaptation officials.82 This 
model can feasibly be implemented internationally, with academic 
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and local communities 
participating in knowledge sharing platforms and partnerships. 
In addition, regional coordination in designing and implementing 
adaptation infrastructure will be especially useful as jurisdictions in 
close geographic proximity also face similar climate challenges. 
Regional coordination can take place at different levels of governance 
and among different kinds of actors. For example, in the U.S., a few 
counties in southeast Florida entered the Southeast Florida Regional 
Climate Compact to respond to the region’s particular vulnerabilities 
to sea level rise by “reshap[ing] facilities for managing storm water, 
wastewater, and drinking water in anticipation of hydrology reshaped 
by higher sea levels.”83 Such subnational inter-jurisdictional 
partnerships allow members to better leverage their federal and state 
funding sources and coordinate adaptive policies in a manner that is 
mindful of nearby jurisdictions’ needs and capacities. 
To encourage local innovation and partnership, domestic legal 
reform is necessary. Currently, in the U.S., the ability of state and local 
governments to establish innovative programs and inter-jurisdictional 
alliances is limited. For example, states hoping to build resilience in 
food security by promoting domestic agriculture may be barred from 
doing so by the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states 
from discriminating against out-of-state products.84 Some states even 
voluntarily restrict their ability to adopt more progressive forms of 
climate action. In North Carolina, for example, the state legislature 
 
 81.  See generally About the Adaptation Clearinghouse, ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/about.html (last visited April 28, 2018).  
 82. ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 79. 
 83.  RICHARD H. MAYS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FORMS GUIDE § 29:10 (3d ed. 2018); see 
also What Is the Compact?, SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT, 
www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/about-us/what-is-the-compact (last visited Apr. 29, 
2018) (providing an overview of the Compact).  
 84.  See Michael Barsa, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause?: Climate Change and 
Food Security, 13 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 40, 56 (2018) (discussing how the uneven geographic 
concentration of food production in the U.S. makes crops especially vulnerable to climate events 
and noting that distributing food production in different states must overcome barriers imposed 
by the Dormant Commerce Clause).  
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passed a “federal ceiling” provision in its Administrative Procedure 
Act that significantly limits the state’s ability to adopt more stringent 
environmental standards than existing federal standards.85 Local 
governments are similarly bound by laws that prohibit them from 
pursuing creative adaptive strategies. In so-called “Dillon’s rule 
states,” local governments may not pursue initiatives unless explicitly 
sanctioned by the state legislature.86 A 2010 survey showed that at least 
36 states in the U.S. are Dillon’s rule states.87 In other words, in most 
states, local governments lack the legal infrastructure to adopt 
innovative adaptation policies. Dillon’s rule centralizes decision 
making power in the state and limits local governments to ex ante 
policy tools on the books, but the complexity and uncertainty of 
climate change mandate flexible and customized arrangement in the 
delegation of political power. Thus, domestic legal reforms that 
empower state and local governments are necessary to effectively 
unleash the resources and partnerships of local adaptive strategies. 
The most important aspect of a network-based approach is 
ensuring all actors’ access to resources. Compared to a centralized 
governance framework, a network-based one can incur significantly 
higher transaction costs in assessing the scientific and social 
implications of the compound impact of climate change,88 in 
coordinating inter-jurisdictional negotiations, and in establishing new 
institutions that facilitate learning and regional partnerships.89 The 
 
 85.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-19.3(a) (2018) (“An agency authorized to implement and 
enforce State and federal environmental laws may not adopt a rule for the protection of the 
environment or natural resources that imposes a more restrictive standard, limitation, or 
requirement than those imposed by federal law or rule, if a federal law or rule pertaining to the 
same subject matter has been adopted, unless adoption of the rule is required by one of the 
subdivisions of this subsection.”). 
 86.  Cities 101 – Delegation of Power, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101-delegation-of-power (describing that Dillon’s rule is a 
“narrow interpretation of a local government’s authority” that allows “a substate government . . . 
[to] engage in an activity only if it is specifically sanctioned by the state government”). The rule 
originated from an opinion by Iowa Supreme Court Chief Justice John F. Dillon, in which he 
declared: “Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly 
from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.” 
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).  
 87.  MATTHEW SELLERS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF JACQUELINE BYERS, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CTYS., COUNTY AUTHORITY: A STATE BY STATE REPORT 204–05 (Dec. 2010).  
 88.  See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text (noting the need to assess and respond to 
not just the impact of climate change itself, but also the impact of adaptive strategies responding 
to climate change).  
 89.  See SUSAN KINNEAR, KYM PATISON, JULIE MANN, ELIZABETH MALONE & VICKI 
ROSS, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION RESEARCH FACILITY, NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: COLLABORATIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUEENSLAND 
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existing vulnerability and resource gap among jurisdictions is already 
putting poor jurisdictions at a significant disadvantage in adapting to 
climate change, and a network-based approach oblivious to this 
inequality would undermine its effectiveness by excluding poorer 
countries from sharing and contributing to the network. As private 
capital plays a bigger role in adaptation financing, less developed 
countries are at a greater disadvantage. Institutional investors are less 
aware of investment opportunities for climate adaptation; even those 
that are aware tend to perceive those investments as having less 
developed financial systems and more volatile markets.90 Yet, these 
countries potentially provide better investment opportunities given 
their greater need for adaptation. A successful network-based 
framework, therefore, must ensure information and financial 
inclusivity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cities and local communities are developing ambitious, innovative 
strategies to adapt to climate change, but there has not been adequate 
discussion over the necessity for and approaches to coordinating these 
efforts. This neglect can significantly impair the effectiveness of climate 
action due to the distinct challenges of climate adaptation. This paper 
draws attention to the perils of uncoordinated adaptation and argues 
that a network-based approach is better suited for adaptation 
coordination. While the foregoing discussion focuses on adaptation in 
particular, the network-based approach it proposes is not meant to 
isolate adaptation from other policy priorities. Rather, adopting a fresh 
paradigm to analyzing adaptation coordination can promote other 
policy priorities91 and facilitate the development of an integrated 
framework for climate action. 
 
 
FLOODS 9 (2013) (citations omitted) (noting “a prerequisite for [the] formation and effective 
function [of network governance frameworks] is that sufficient human, social and economic 
resources are available to outweigh the transaction costs”).  
 90.  See Geoffrey Heal, Funding Climate Adaptation, in THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND 
BEYOND: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY POST-2020, at 92 (Robert N. Stavis & 
Robert C. Stowe eds., 2016) (noting challenges to private adaptation investments in less 
developed countries).   
 91.  See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (discussing how a network-based 
approach can identify synergies between policyd priorities and address existing inequalities). 
